Chile’s recent history has gone through a hybrid conjuncture between what has been called the “social outbreak” on October 18, 2019, and the declaration of health emergency by COVID-19 promulgated on March 18, 2020. In such a context, this article describes and interprets two presidential speeches that announce the States of Exception based on conjunctural enemies’ rise. This social problem is investigated from Critical Discourse Studies and Systemic Functional Linguistics, particularly the appraisal system, together with the categories of legitimation proposed (...) by van Leeuwen. This research is positioned from a qualitative perspective and takes as a corpus of analysis the two speeches declaring a State of Exception by President Piñera in 2019 and 2020, respectively. These speeches are available to the public at https://prensa.presidencia.cl/. The results show that an enemy is constructed in both cases by contrasting the actions taken or not, which present negative appreciation valuations in the case of COVID-19 and negative integrity judgments in the case of the social outbreak. In both cases, key social actors emerge that are firmly legitimized within the State of Exception framework, which in turn is based on the categories of authority and moral legitimation. In conclusion, the enemy’s construction is identified in both cases with modification of the actors that interact through a problem, an action, and an agent that solves the problem constructed. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza la construcción de sentidos del pasado dictatorial chileno a través de micro-narraciones cotidianas. Se realiza a partir del estudio de tramas de memoria local conformadas en la vida cotidiana de un barrio de Santiago de Chile, dentro de las cuales uno de sus componentes centrales son las micro-narraciones, o lo que ha sido descrito en otros contextos como memorias fragmentadas. El objetivo de este artículo es comprenderlas como forma de memoria y analizar su rol en (...) los procesos de transmisión intergeneracional a nivel local. Con ello, se ponen en tensión aquellos planteamientos que observan la fragmentación desde las dificultades que representa para la comunicación del pasado, en tanto forma que desafía los modos convencionales de narración. Tal como muestra la investigación etnográfica, en el contexto de un territorio cargado históricamente de conflictos, esta forma de memoria tiene especial preeminencia respecto de la constitución de referentes cotidianos que participan de procesos de identificación y arraigo en los jóvenes. (shrink)

This article presents the results of the evaluations of the mechanical stresses associated with the performance of manual lifting tasks of loads and those operators must endure in their workplaces, considering these the most recurrent cases and positions. This study is based on a static analysis of certainspecific positions of the human body, the transmission of forces through the musculoskeletal structure, and the generation of efforts at critical points of the body. In addition to this, it is considered a revision (...) of the criteria of the Spanish Technical Standard NTP-477. There are critical points of the musculoskeletal structure that support considerable efforts, the recommendations and criteria provided by the NTP-477 are relevant and although limited, provide an adequate margin of safety to avoid injury to workers. (shrink)

BackgroundThis study analyzed the difference in psychological distress of the healthcare workers in three different periods of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in Argentina. Specifically, from the third week of the mandatory quarantine through the two following weeks.MethodsAnalysis of the responses of 1,458 members of the health personnel was done on a questionnaire on healthcare workers concerns regarding the care of patients with coronavirus, indicators of depression, anxiety, intolerance of uncertainty, and coping.ResultsThe psychological indicators that were considered presented differences (...) between the evaluated periods. Perceived concerns about the possibility of infecting loved ones and infecting themselves were greatest in the periods after the onset of the pandemic. In addition, the perception of how the work environment worsened and how lack of sleep interfered with their work was also higher in periods 2 and 3. The same results were found in the indicators of depression, anxiety, and intolerance of uncertainty. Finally, the indicators of high tension and concurrent lack of emotional control, which was greater in the last periods evaluated, were also expressed in the coping strategies (showing emotional lability, only contained by hypercontrol).ConclusionThe differences found in the psychological indicators between the evaluated periods support the need for early psychological care of health personnel which should be a priority of public health and a fundamental fact to increase its immediate effectiveness in the care of infected patients. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

While philosophical questions about health and disease have attracted much attention in recent decades, and while opinions are divided on most issues, influential accounts seem to embrace negativism about health, according to which health is the absence of disease. Some subscribe to unrestricted negativism, which claims that negativism applies not only to the concepts of health and disease as used by healthcare professionals but also to the lay concept that underpins everyday thinking. Whether people conceptualize health in this manner has (...) implications for medical care and public health, and so we set out to examine this claim in two studies. Participants were asked to assess and compare the health states of two people presented in two vignettes. We found that both lay people and medical students conceptualize health as something more than the absence of disease. We argue that our findings highlight a need to rethink unrestricted negativism and indicate a need to rethink the way the debate has traditionally focused on disease. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

Defining a class of sets to be uniform Δ02 if it is derived from a binary {0,1}{0,1}-valued function f≤TKf≤TK, we show that, for any C⊆DeC⊆De induced by such a class, there exists a high Δ02 degree c which is incomparable with every degree b ϵ Ce \ {0e, 0'e}. We show how this result can be applied to quite general subclasses of the Ershov Hierarchy and we also prove, as a direct corollary, that every nonzero low degree caps with both (...) a high and a nonzero low Δ02 degree. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

We sometimes fail unwittingly to do things that we ought to do. And we are, from time to time, culpable for these unwitting omissions. We provide an outline of a theory of responsibility for unwitting omissions. We emphasize two distinctive ideas: (i) many unwitting omissions can be understood as failures of appropriate vigilance, and; (ii) the sort of self-control implicated in these failures of appropriate vigilance is valuable. We argue that the norms that govern vigilance and the value of self-control (...) explain culpability for unwitting omissions. (shrink)

We show that every nonzero Δ20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Delta^{0}_{2}}$$\end{document} enumeration degree bounds the enumeration degree of a 1-generic set. We also point out that the enumeration degrees of 1-generic sets, below the first jump, are not downwards closed, thus answering a question of Cooper.

Faith, reason and hermeneutic in the thought of The Spanish Jews. The history of the Jewish Philosophy differenciates two big tendencies among the Spanish Jews in the Middle Ages: the philosophy and the cabbala. However I think that we must take into consideration other aspects such as the mussulman culture and religion, the living together with the Christian culture and the contact with the European Jews whose problem was similar to the difficulties of the Spanish Jews.

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the nature of understanding in medicine. The first part describes in more detail what it means to understand something and links a type of understanding (i.e., objectual understanding) to explanations. The second part proceeds to investigate what objectual understanding of a disease (i.e., biomedical understanding) requires by considering the case of scurvy from the history of medi- cine. The main hypothesis is that grasping a mechanistic explanation of a condi- tion is necessary for a biomedical (...) understanding of that condition. The third part of the paper argues that biomedical understanding is necessary, but not sufficient for understanding in a clinical context (i.e., clinical understanding). The hypothe- sis is that clinical understanding combines biomedical understanding of a disease or pathological condition with understanding illness, which involves some degree of personal understanding of the patient. It is argued that, in many cases, clinical understanding necessitates adopting a particular second-personal stance and using cognitive resources in addition to those involved in biomedical understanding. (shrink)

La mondialisation apparaît inhérente à la logique économique capitaliste. La longue marche de la mondialisation s'est accélérée avec la déréglementation américaine des télécommunications. Or, les dualités et les fractures se renforcent dans ce nouvel ordre. En réalité, ne sommes-nous pas aujourd'hui dans un monde où se déploient à outrance des technologies sans information et sans communication? Un monde dont il faudrait retrouver le sens perdu...Globalization is inherent in the capitalist economic logic. The long march of globalization has accelerated with the (...) deregulation of American telecommunications. However, the dualities and fractures reinforce in this new order. In reality, we are not in a world where excessive deploy technology without information and communication? A world where it would find the lost sense.. (shrink)

Moral psychology is the study of how human minds make and are made by human morality. This state of the art volume covers contemporary philosophical and psychological work on moral psychology, as well as notable historical theories and figures in the field of moral psychology, such as Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, and the Buddha. The volume’s 50 chapters, authored by leading figures in the field, cover foundational topics, such as character, virtue, emotion, moral responsibility, the neuroscience of morality, weakness of will, (...) and the nature of moral judgments and reasons. The volume also canvases emerging work in applied moral psychology, including adaptive preferences, animals, mental illness, poverty, marriage, race, bias, and victim blaming. (shrink)

Neil Levy (2007) argues that empirical data shows that psychopaths lack the moral knowledge required for moral responsibility. His account is intriguing, and it offers a promising way to think about the significance of psychopaths for work on moral responsibility. In what follows we focus on three lines of concern connected to Levy's account: his interpretation of the data, the scope of exculpation, and the significance of biological explanations for anti-social behavior.

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

The importance of socio-economic impacts from the introduction and use of genetically modified crops is reflected in increasing efforts to include them in regulatory frameworks. Aiming to identify and understand the present knowledge on SEI of GM crops, we here report the findings from an extensive study of the published international scientific peer-reviewed literature. After applying specified selection criteria, a total of 410 articles are analysed. The main findings include: limited empirical research on SEI of GM crops in the scientific (...) literature; the main focus of the majority of the published research is on a restricted set of monetary economic parameters; proportionally, there are very few empirical studies on social and non-monetary economic aspects; most of the research reports only short-term findings; the variable local contexts and conditions are generally ignored in research methodology and analysis; conventional agriculture is the commonly used comparator, with minimal consideration of other substantially different agricultural systems; and there is the overall tendency to frame the research upon not validated theoretical assumptions, and to over-extrapolate small-scale and short-term specific results to generalized conclusions. These findings point to a lack of empirical and comprehensive research on SEI of GM crops for possible use in decision-making. Broader questions and improved methodologies, assisted by more rigorous peer-review, will be required to overcome current research shortcomings. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

Our EcoDialogue Center is an educational space for human sustainability within the University of Veracruz. We propose that creating sustainable knowledge requires re-thinking how we conceive ourselves as human beings. This requires paying attention to what we call “the quality of being,” which means caring about and attending to the physical–emotional–mental–spiritual as the foundation of education. This way we can create a space where we can dialogue contemplatively where all dimensions of our lives interact; the physical, the emotional, the communitarian, (...) the social politic, the planetarium, and the spiritual being act with social–environmental responsibility. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

It is common to distinguish between “holist” and “reductionist” views of brain function, where the former envisions the brain as functioning as an indivisible unit and the latter as a collection of distinct units that serve different functions. Opposing reductionism, a number of researchers have pointed out that cortical network architecture does not respect functional boundaries, and the neuroanatomist V. Braitenberg proposed to understand the cerebral cortex as a “great mixing machine” of neuronal activity from sensory inputs, motor commands, and (...) intrinsically generated processes. In this paper, we offer a contextualization of Braitenberg’s point, and we review evidence for the interactions of neuronal activity from multiple sensory inputs and intrinsic neuronal processes in the cerebral cortex. We focus on new insights from studies on audiovisual interactions and on the influence of respiration on brain functions, which do not seem to align well with “reductionist” views of areal functional boundaries. Instead, they indicate that functional boundaries are fuzzy and context dependent. In addition, we discuss the relevance of the influence of sensory, proprioceptive, and interoceptive signals on cortical activity for understanding brain-body interactions, highlight some of the consequences of these new insights for debates on embodied cognition, and offer some suggestions for future studies. (shrink)

I discuss the ontology and normativity of affordances by suggesting that their ontology can be dualist and that their normativity, although socioculturally shaped, has an affective biological value….

Little has been studied on the relationship between affect and school problems related with attendance. This study aims to identify different affective profiles and to determine whether these profiles differ from each other based on the four functional conditions of school refusal behavior. Participants comprised 1,816 Spanish adolescents aged 15–18 years. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children-Short Form and the School Refusal Assessment Scale-Revised for Children were administered. Latent profile analysis revealed five affective profiles: low affective profile, self-fulfilling (...) profile, low positive affect profile, self-destructive profile, and high affective profile. The self-destructive profile revealed the highest average scores in the first three factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the high affective profile reached the highest average score in the fourth factor. On the contrary, the self-fulfilling profile obtained the lowest average scores in the first two factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the low affective profile revealed the lowest average scores in the last two factors. Findings suggest the relevance of developing more adaptative affective profiles, such as the self-fulfilling profile, which would contribute to diminishing school attendance problems. (shrink)

This article addresses the relationships between dialectic and learning within the constellations of the conceptual universes of Adorno and Vygotsky. In that order, we proceed to analyze the set of links between the main dialectical categories that structure the dialectical approach that characterizes both representatives of the Marxist thought tradition (process, totality, mediation, fields of force, antagonism, praxis) and the communicating vessels that go from epistemology to aesthetics and that demonstrate the relevance of the tasks of thought in the face (...) of social transformation. Finally, the article addresses the question of an (im)possible analytical horizon that arises, from both thinkers, to emphatically think about social emancipation and its challenges today. (shrink)

Este artículo explora algunas de las relaciones entre dialéctica y filosofía dentro del programa de una dialéctica modificada de Theodor W. Adorno ¿Cómo pensar la tensión entre las categorías dialécticas y la filosofía desde el prisma de una dialéctica negativa? ¿Qué significa desde el pensamiento de Adorno a liberar a la filosofía y a la dialéctica de su carácter afirmativo? Elaborar estas preguntas es el objetivo de este trabajo.

In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)